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1. Introduction 
Rules of origin are an important aspect of preferential trade agreements (PTAs).  They 
affect both North-South free trade agreements (FTAs), like U.S.-Mexico trade under the 
NAFTA, and North-North trade, like U.S.-Canada trade and EU trade with other 
European economies under various FTAs.  They have also been blamed for the failure of 
developing country trade preference schemes.  Baldwin (2001) warns of their potential 
use as technical barriers to trade.    
The relevance of rules of origin in recent preferential trade schemes has spawned 
a new formal literature.  This includes exploration of the importance of rules of origin 
for the political economy of regional agreements (Duttagupta and Panagariya 2001), as 
well as the impact of rules of origin on outside country access to internal markets (Ju and 
Krishna 1998).  Other work of this type includes Falvey and Reed (1998) and Krishna 
and Krueger (1995).   
The roots of rules of origin regimes can be found in the relative complexity of 
PTAs vis-à-vis customs unions.  For example, because free trade agreements (FTAs) do 
not have a common external tariff, the risk exists that goods will be diverted through the 
lowest FTA-partner tariff and into the FTA block.  Because of this possibility, one stated 
reason for rules of origin is that they are designed to ensure that only goods produced 
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within a free trade block actually receive free trade treatment.  At least, that is the theory.1  
In practice, assigning the origin of a product is not simple, as value added is sometimes 
included and sometimes not, local content thresholds vary, and products can and do lose 
their FTA origin as they cross borders.  In addition, the assignment of origin is clearly 
subject to political factors, much like contingent protection. 
In Europe, a regime of  “Pan-European cumulation,” entered into force on 1 
January 1997.  It originally applied in all of the EEA countries (Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the UK, Ireland, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), in Switzerland 
(EFTA member), and in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.  Turkey joined in late 1999,2 and is 
working to implement the regime.   The European rules require that the inputs in fact 
originate within the free trade area.  Otherwise, processing requirements in the rules of 
origin have to be complied with if the finished product is to have free trade status.  A 
similar arrangement for the Mediterranean countries is due to take effect by 2010. 
In the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the rules of origin state 
that a product originates in the free trade area when it is wholly produced or substantially 
transformed in the free trade area. Substantial transformation occurs when processing 
causes a product to shift from one tariff classification to another.  NAFTA rules of 
origin include a “de minimis” provision that permits a final NAFTA good to contain a 
small quantity of the same kind of good from a non-NAFTA source (up to 7 percent of 
the value of each shipment, or 9 percent in the case of cigarettes and cigars).  The motor 
vehicle sector was heavily involved in the design of the NAFTA rules of origin, and from 
the beginning it was clear that their purpose was to provide additional protect to 
intermediate parts producers and to increase costs for integrated operations owned by 
Japanese automakers. 
Much of the literature on rules of origin works from the premise of homogenous 
goods.  This is in keeping with a large part of the literature on trade creation and 
diversion under PTAs.  In contrast, this paper is concerned with rules of origin in the 
context of Ethier-type two-way trade in differentiated intermediate goods (Ethier 1979, 
                                                
1 See Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Panagariya (2000) for more on this point. 
2 Turkey originally signed protocols for accession to the system of European cumulation in late 1999, 
though by 2001 (relevant for the empirics in Sections 3 and 4) transitional arrangements were still being 
implemented.  The most critical effect has been to strengthen the operational effectiveness of the customs 
union between the EU and Turkey. 
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1982).  Such differentiation of intermediates is an important aspect of recent division of 
labor models of trade, geography, and growth (Francois and Nelson 2002).  The 
analytical approach followed here is similar in spirit to that taken in ex ante studies of the 
impact of the NAFTA on the automobile industry.3  Manufacturing involves use of 
intermediate inputs that are differentiated by intermediate firms, with two-way trade of 
intermediates and benefits from an increased division of labor through trade.  Emphasis 
is placed on the pattern of production and trade in such a framework, and in particular 
on the relative importance of trade in intermediates vis-à-vis trade in final goods when 
rules or origin are imposed on a trade-equilibrium.    
While the literature stresses the discriminatory impact of PTAs with rules of 
origin, there is at the same time an inherent ambiguity regarding rules of origin, at least 
when we make comparisons to customs union regimes.  This is because regional 
agreements can reduce internal trading costs.  In particular, while FTAs punish use of 
external intermediates, customs unions (CUs) and ancillary trade facilitation measures 
may reward the use of internal intermediates, reducing the costs of moving goods cross-
border.4  These carrot and stick mechanisms both work in the same direction, which 
means that the impact of use of rules of origin in FTAs on trade in intermediates vis-à-
vis similar trade in a customs union without need of rules of original is actually 
ambiguous.  We highlight this issue here, stressing the theoretical impact of rules of 
origin, while isolating these from border effects (realized through cost reductions in 
customs unions) in the empirics. 
The paper is organized as follows.  An analytical model is first developed in 
Section 2, from which basic expectations are developed regarding differences between 
rules of origin (i.e. FTAs instead of customs unions) and the pattern of trade and 
production in intermediate and final goods.  A technical innovation here involves the 
conceptual use of an actual set of global equilibrium prices for the examination of trade 
between different pairs of countries under various rules of origin.  The theory-based 
discussion is followed by a formal econometric cross-section analysis of OECD bilateral 
trade in finished motor vehicles and parts.  The econometric evidence suggests that FTA 
rules of origin can be an effective barrier against third-country suppliers of intermediate 
goods.   In the context of Europe, trade facilitation measures (the European carrot rather 
                                                
3 See Lopez-de-Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford (1994). 
4 In both the 200+year old North American customs union (i.e. the United States), and in the European 
Union since the single-market was implemented in the early 1990s, goods move more or less freely across 
internal borders. 
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than the NAFTA stick) dominate, revealing the importance of border effect mitigation 
within customs unions.  In addition, while European accumulation rules are 
discriminatory against third countries, they appear to extend most of the benefits of 
customs union membership (apart from border effects) to the larger European 
Economic Area.  
 
2. Analytical Expectations 
In this section the impact of PTAs on intermediates trade is explored in an analytical 
framework involving Ethier-type two-way trade in differentiated intermediates (Ethier 
1979, 1982).5  Domestic and imported intermediate goods are specialized compliments in 
production, and potential gains from the division of labor in intermediate goods, and 
with intermediate goods themselves being used to produce final, traded goods.  In formal 
terms, we examine the properties of PTA partners within a global trading equilibrium.  
This allows us to take world prices as given at actual equilibrium values as we examine a 
given set of countries, and to then focus on differences across PTA country pairs within 
the equilibrium price set as implied by differences in rules of origin.  We are able to then 
isolate expected intra-PTA differences related directly to rules-based costs for use of 
non-PTA intermediates.   
We focus on three countries, indexes by i=1…3.  Countries 1 and 2, on impose 
an PTA that leaves out country 3.  Country 3 represents the rest-of-world region vis-à-vis 
countries 1 and 2, and is represented in the system by world prices representing the trade 
equilibrium price set.  For both countries 1 and 2, we assume a transformation 
technology g(.) that maps production of the numeraire good wheat, represented by W, 
and intermediate factor bundles, represented by b, used in the production of 
manufactured goods, both as inputs to intermediate input production and as value added.    
Formally, our transformation technology is represented by equation (1).  It has 
the usual properties of convexity. 
 
(1) 
  
b
i
= g
i
(W
i
),  i = 1,2   g' ,g' '< 0 
 
Assuming W is homogenous, we set the intra-PTA price of wheat at unity, and give it the 
job of serving as numeraire.  We can then represent the supply price of bundles 
                                                
5 The analytical model developed here is similar in spirit to Lopez-de-Silanes, Markusen Rutherford (1994), 
Markusen, Rutherford, and Hunter (1995) and Francois (1994).   
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(assuming competitive factor markets) as an artifact of the transformation technology.  
These are formalized in equations (2) and (3).6 
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(3) 
 
P
W
i
= 1 i = 1,2  
 
We next turn to intermediate goods.  We are interested in two-way trade in 
intermediates.  In reduced form, we will have a mapping from bundles prices to prices 
for composite intermediates.  This is represented in equation (4).  The h-function in 
equation (4) is a consequence of increasing returns to specialization in intermediate 
goods, and from the primal functional mapping of bundles to intermediates (Francois 
and Nelson 2002).  It builds on the following property of Ethier-type trade models with 
a CES-aggregator for traded intermediates.  With some manipulation we can represent 
the reduced form system as one involving a composite region specific intermediate good 
m produced under external increasing returns to scale.  In terms of the region-indexed 
intermediate good, the remainder of the intermediate demand system can then be 
modeled as one involving CES-type preferences with regional rather than firm indexing. 7 
 
(4) 
  
P
m
i
= h(m
i
) ! P
b
i
,  h > 0, h'< 0,  i = 1,2  
 
In working with equation (4), we assume that we generally operate on the concave region 
of the product transformation surface, which simply means that the curvature of the g(.) 
function in equation (1), which reflects opportunity costs for bundles vis-à-vis wheat, 
dominates reduced-form scale effects as embodied in the h function over the range of 
relevant equilibria.  When this is not the case we will be in unstable equilibria, with 
stability ultimately either involving equilibria like those we have just assumed, or else 
corner solutions.  Under constant returns, the h function would simply be a linear 
operator. 
                                                
6 Both superscripts and subscripts are used to denote countries.  In general, superscripts denote values 
related to where an intermediate or final good originates, in terms of either quantities or prices.  Subscripts 
denote the use of goods in production or consumption. 
7 A full derivation of this representation of monopolistic competition for traded intermediates can be 
found in Francois and Roland-Holst (1997). 
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We are concerned with the impact of PTAs on trading costs as manifested as 
reduced-form trading costs.  As such, we introduce them here as a markup on the cost of 
intermediates for final goods producers. 
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In equation (5), k jimP ),(, represents the trading-cost inclusive price of intermediates from 
region k when used in region i to produce a good for region j, given trading costs k jimT ),(, .  
For final goods production in the manufacturing sector, we assume a CES-based 
production function, defined over value added measured directly in units of bundles, and 
in terms of composite regional intermediate goods.  In dual form, the cost function for a 
regional manufactured good is then as represented in equation (6). 
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In equation (6), the ω terms are exponential CES-weights from the underlying CES 
production function.  In the dual context shown here, they serve as inverse cost weights 
for mapping input prices into final good prices.   
Note that with constant returns under a CES production technology involving 
value-added and assembly, we implicitly assume that production can be separated 
between production for home, partner, and ROW markets to reflect relative input cost 
variations as detailed below.  This means we can index cost of production of Y by 
destination market. Again, we are also interested in potential trading costs, and so again 
introduce a trading cost wedge on final goods. 
 
 (7) P
Y , j
(i, j )
= P
Y  
(i, j )
T
Y , j
i
, T ! 1,  i " j  
 
In equation (7) ),( ),(
ji
iYP denotes the producer price of good Y produced in region i for 
consumption in region j while ),( ),,(
ji
jiYP  denotes the consumer price of the same good given 
final-good trading cost i jYT , .  
 7 
From equation (6), and the first-order conditions for cost-minimization in Y 
production, we also can map composite intermediate input demand to relative internal 
prices and the total quantity produced.  This is represented below in equation (8). 
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In equation (8), k jim ),( denotes intermediates produced in region k and used in region i for 
final goods production destined for region j.  We can make a similar derivation for total 
value-added VA, represented by equation (9) below. 
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When we combine intermediates demand and value added we then have total 
demand for factor bundles in the manufacturing sector.  This is shown in equation (10), 
where the h function represents the primal mapping technology in equation (4) from 
factor input bundles employed in m production to m itself. 
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Turning to final demand, we assume CES preferences defined over regional final 
manufactured goods.  Since income itself can be mapped from the price of bundles, 
regional demand for regional varieties will be a function of the vector of goods prices 
within a national economy P and also of bundles prices.  In total (and assuming third-
country demand for regional goods is also a function of price in the observed 
equilibrium), total demand for regional varieties will be a function of the degree of 
substitution between varieties, as measured by the substitution elasticity ε, and of the 
price vectors for final goods and bundles. 
 
(11) ),,( !TPDY i =  
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Together, equations (1)-(11) give us 11 sets of functional relationships that determine a 
comparable set of unknowns: 
  
Pb
i
,PW
i
,Pm
i
,Pm,i
j
,b
i
,PY
i
,PY , j
i
,VA
i
,m j
i
,Y
i
,W
i . 
We now turn to the differential impact of FTAs and CUs. For a starting point, 
we assume a customs union within the framework spelled-out above, meaning identical 
external tariffs and free movement of all goods internally.  With this regional integrated 
equilibrium as the benchmark for the country pair, we then move to introduce trading 
costs to reflect the introduction of rules of origin, which characterizes an important 
difference in practice between FTAs and customs unions.  Assuming that these rules are 
binding, then in reduced form we will see an increase in the effective cost of using 
intermediates from outside the CU/FTA (see equation 5), which can in turn be mapped 
to an effective increase in the inverse cost weights (i.e. a drop in the weights) in equation 
(8).  How the increase is realized depends on how the rules are operationalized.  They 
could range from a sliding scale involving tariffs on third-country inputs to tariffs on the 
whole product (including FTA inputs and value added).  In practice these rules are 
constantly evolving.  For our purposes here, we simply assume that third-country 
intermediates used for internally traded final goods effectively cost more to use once we 
introduce rules of origin.  The implication of such a change is immediately clear from 
equation (12) below, which is derived from equation (8).  Equation (12) defines the 
relative input mix of intermediates, by country of origin, as a function of relative input 
costs.  With the consequent shift in the cost of using third-country inputs, as they imply a 
cost increase related to some financial penalty like loss of duty-free treatment for the 
final good, we will see a downward shift in the relative importance of third-country 
intermediates, and a shift toward FTA-originating inputs.  Hence, there will be a shift 
toward intermediates that are internally produced, and away from third county 
intermediates.  
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Depending on the specific form of the rules or origin and related penalties, such a shift 
would be made to the point where the marginal value of product of imported third-
county inputs exceeds penalty costs. For the present exercise (and the empirics that 
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follow), the important point is just the end result.  There will be a shift toward FTA 
inputs, if all other factors are held fixed. 
 At the same time, CUs themselves can involve lower cross-border trading costs 
than FTAs.  For example, the European Union, with its single market program, has led 
to the dismantling of border posts across Europe, and to cross-border cooperation to 
speed the clearing of goods.  This has the effect of reducing the cost of using internal 
inputs.  The obvious contrast is to the border crossing-points within NAFTA, where 
FTA inputs still have to clear border checks.  This effect will work in the opposite 
direction from rules of origin.  In our controlled analytical experiment, where we only 
introduce rules of origin on an otherwise clean slate, the impact will be a relative shift 
toward internal intermediates.  However, when we move from our hypothetical world to 
actual data, we will also expect to see a rising border cost as we shift from a CU to an 
FTA.  This would imply a rising cost for use of internal intermediates, so that the shift 
may be in the opposite direction.  The net effect is an empirical question.  
A second impact of this increase in the effective cost of external inputs (relative 
to our integrated customs union benchmark equilibrium) will be to increase the cost of 
producing final manufactured goods for export to the relevant CU/FTA partner.  This is 
shown in equation (13) below for exports from Country 1 to Country 2, which follows 
from manipulation of equation (6). 
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Assuming CES demand for the final manufactured good, we will then also have a version 
of equation (12) that involves final goods. 
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Since we translate rules of origin into increases in the cost of using non-FTA 
intermediates when producing goods for sale to an FTA partner,8 from equation (13) we 
can derive directly the elasticity of the price of supplying a final good to an FTA partner 
with respect to this increase in the price of non-FTA intermediate inputs. 
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In equation (15), the term k
jim
ji
Y PP ),(,
),(! is the elasticity of the cost of producing good Y in 
country i for market j, with respect to rules-induced increases in the price of 
intermediates from country k when used for good destined for market j. What happens 
to the demand for inputs?  Starting from equation (A.8), we can derive the change in 
demand for non-FTA intermediates as follows.   
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This in turn can be manipulated, by dividing through our definition of k jim ),( , to yield the 
percent change in intermediate demand. 
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Finally, dividing through by relative price changes, and making a substitution from 
equation (15), we arrive at an elasticity representation of the impact of rules-induced 
non-FTA intermediate goods price increases on the use of intermediates for FTA 
partner-destined final goods. 
 
                                                
8 Obviously, such rules do not apply directly to the choice of inputs used to serve third (non-FTA 
markets).  Neither are they immediately relevant for production for the home market.  Where they bite is 
in the production of goods for export to the FTA partner. 
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In the context of a given set of world equilibrium prices, deviations in internal 
prices from world benchmark prices are directly defined by deviations in the effective 
trading cost imposed by rules of origin. 
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This in turn means that equation (18), following a substitution from equation (19), yields 
the impact of such trading costs on intermediate input demand. 
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Note that in equation (20), we have also taken advantage of equation (19), which implies 
that k
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k
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),( !! = and where the second term is defined in equation (A.15).  The 
shift in relative intermediate import demand in the production process for each final 
product line follows directly from the definition of substitution elasticities as used in the 
cost and input demand equations above.  
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Consider next the impact on relative final product demands, and hence on 
relative trade shares for final products.  Again, assuming CES final demands, the shift in 
relative final goods demand follows directly from the definition of the substitution 
elasticity, this time from equation (14).   
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In equation (22), 
3
)1,2(,)1,2(
)1,(
,
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T
Y
Y
! represents the elasticity of relative final product demand for 
goods consumed in region 1, with respect to a rules-induced change in the cost of using 
intermediates from country 2 (an FTA partner) to produce goods for consumption in 
region 1. Again, we have taken advantage of the relationship of rules-induced costs to 
prices, given that we are working in the context of a given set of world equilibrium 
prices.  Consider next the impact on actual rather than relative trade flows.  This follows 
from final product demand elasticities, and the impact of rules-based trading costs for 
intermediates on the price of final goods (from equation 15). 
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Taken together, equations (20) and (23) say that we expect a drop in intra-FTA trade in 
final goods under increasingly restrictive rules of origin. 
Next, we turn to the cross-price effects of rules-induced trade costs on intra-FTA 
demand for intermediate inputs.  We again start from equations (5) and (8).  
Differentiating equation (8) for cross-price effects yields equation (24).  
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Some further manipulation yields equation (25), which can then be summarized in 
elasticity form as in equation (26). 
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In Equation (26), the term v
jim
k
ji Pm ),(,),( ,
!  measures the marginal shift toward region k inputs 
as rules of origin discriminate against region v inputs.  The equation says that at the 
margin, rules-of-origin may yield more or less trade in intermediate inputs.  On the one 
hand, they force a substitution toward FTA-origin parts and away from outside supplies 
of intermediates in the production of goods destined for the FTA partner.  This has a 
positive effect on intra-FTA demand for intermediates (and hence on internal trade).  On 
the other hand, these rules also drive up prices, which forces overall demand toward 
non-FTA supplies of final goods.  This depresses overall demand for intermediate goods.  
Finally, we turn to the relative composition of intermediate and final goods in bilateral 
trade flows.  We define the change in imported FTA intermediates used for intra-FTA 
exports of the final good Y relative to the change in intra-FTA imports from of the final 
good from that same partner in the form of the elasticity 
)1,2(
2
)2,1(
Y
m
! , where we are indexing 
trade of goods produced in region 1 and sold in region 2.  Working from equations (23) 
and (26), we then have the following result: 
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Starting with a customs union as a benchmark, these results imply a set of 
stylized shifts in the pattern of production and trade that can be expected if we observe 
different rules of origin across pairs of countries within a given global trading 
equilibrium.  These can be summarized as follows. 
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 Observation 1:  With the introduction of binding rules of origin against third-
country intermediate goods, the volume of trade in finished goods will fall 
between FTA partners, all other things being equal.  This follows from equation 
(23). 
 
 Observation 2:  Import demand for finished goods in the manufacturing sector 
will shift away from FTA partners and toward third-country suppliers as a result 
of imposing rules of origin for intermediate goods onto an FTA.  This follows 
from equation (22). 
 
 Observation 3: In contrast to final goods, demand for intermediate goods will 
shift away from third-country suppliers, and toward FTA-partner suppliers as a 
result of imposing binding rules of origin.  This follows from equation (21). 
 
 Observation 4: The volume of internal trade in intermediates may rise or fall, 
depending on substitution effects at given levels of production, weighed against 
the drop in final good production for the internal market.  This follows from 
equation (25). 
 
What happens to the relative composition of intra-FTA trade, in terms of 
intermediates and final goods?  We expect a drop in intra-FTA trade in finished goods 
from Observation 1.  The effect on intermediates is murkier.  Two opposing forces drive 
the trade in intermediates.  It may go up due to substitution or down if the impact on the 
cost of production is strong enough to drive down total production of final goods 
sufficiently.  This second effect is probably second-order though, so that the 
intermediate goods volume should also go up.  If we focus on the FTA imports of final 
goods by Country 1 from Country 2 and exports of intermediates from Country 1 to 
Country 2, this ratio will fall, since even if exports of intermediates fall, they will fall at 
less than any drop in total targeted production of final goods for Country 1 in the 
Country 2 industry (because of offsetting substitution effects).  We can say the same 
thing for comparable FTA imports of final goods and exports of intermediates between 
Country 2 and Country 1.  However, when we look strictly at bilateral exports of 
Country 1 to Country 2, or Country 2 to Country 1, we have an ambiguity following 
from Observations 1 and 4.  We summarize these results as follows: 
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 Observation 5: The expected relative allocation of total trade between Countries 
1 and 2 will shift from final goods to intermediates as we introduce binding rules 
of origin. 
 
 Observation 6: For Country 1, the expected relative allocation between total 
exports of intermediates to Country 2 and imports of final goods from Country 2 
will shift to intermediates as we introduce binding rules of origin. 
 
 Observation 7: For Country 1, the expected relative allocation between total 
imports of intermediates from Country 2 and imports of final goods from 
Country 2 will be ambiguous.  
 
One way to read Observation 6 is that binding rules of origin will drive down the 
size of offshore assembly activities as measured in terms of final goods within the FTA, 
even as the FTA-content of those activities goes up measured in terms of the mix of 
intermediate goods consumption.  Of course, in all the discussion of final goods here we 
are holding discrimination against finished vehicles constant.  If FTA implementation 
also introduces an additional element of discrimination against third-country finished 
goods relative to our customs union benchmark, such direct effects will likely outweigh 
the indirect ones stressed here. 
In all fairness, when moving from theory to empirics, these results must be 
approached with caution.  By construction, CUs and FTAs involve a great deal more 
than just rules of origin.  They are packages that can include harmonization and mutual 
recognition of standards, acceleration of customs clearance procedures, and deregulation 
of foreign direct investment.  Such regime shifts and policy differences, which have been 
effectively sterilized in this section, can be quite dramatic, and may outweigh the direct 
effects of rules of origin in the data.   
 
3. Motor Vehicles and Parts 
a. The data 
We next turn to a more formal empirical assessment.  This involves data on the value of 
motor vehicles trade from UNCTAD’s COMTRADE dataset for 2001, supplemented 
with estimates of bilateral tariff rates taken from World Bank’s WITS dataset.  The data 
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are for trade in motor vehicles, represented by SIC (rev1) 732, which is all motor vehicles 
and parts, and SIC 7328 (rev 1), which is motor vehicle parts only.  We have relatively 
complete data for bilateral trade between 27 OECD Member and associate countries:  
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, and the United 
States.  These countries cover a range of preferential arrangements.  In addition to the 
NAFTA (U.S., Canada, Mexico), and the European Union, we also have FTAs within 
Europe through EFTA (Norway and Switzerland), the European Economic Area (EFTA 
and the EU, but without Switzerland), and an EU-Turkey customs union.  In addition, 
the EU has extended FTA status to the East European economies in this period (Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic), as has EFTA.  Japan, Korea, and Australia are left out 
of these arrangements entirely (though Australia and New Zealand have an FTA).   
Critically, since roughly 1997, the EU has also negotiated a set of European accumulation 
rules on most though not all of its FTA partners.  As a result, many countries that were 
in a hub-and-spoke arrangement with the EU now benefit from Europe-wide rules of 
origin, with the net effect being a relatively large Europe-wide FTA, with the EU15 at 
the center.  The implementation of the arrangement, however, excluded Turkey at the 
time, though it did include candidate countries (the new 10 EU Members).  In short, the 
cross-section provides a nice sample of rules of origin arrangements. 
 
b. Regression Model and Results 
We are interested in the apparent relationship between FTA vs. customs union 
membership, on the one hand and hence the assumed or explicit application or non-
application of rules of origin, and on the other hand the pattern of trade and the relative 
importance of intermediate and final product trade as outlined in Section 2 above.  Our 
focus will be on the relative importance of individual partners for trade in motor vehicles 
and parts.  By implication, and as summarized above in Section 2, a shift toward traded 
intermediates also implies a shift in production toward intra-FTA intermediates.  
 We define an index for intermediates trade, ζ1.  This measures the relative 
importance of a trading partner in total imports of intermediates. 
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From Observation 3 above, we expect ζ1 to rise for an FTA imposing binding rules of 
origin, relative to an otherwise comparable customs union.   
 We are also interested in the composition of final vs. intermediates goods trade.  
In theory, restrictions on the use of intermediates should cause the relative importance of 
parts to rise within an FTA.  This assumes we hold final goods protection constant.  
However, in practice the forces that drive protection of intermediates will also drive 
rules-based protection of final goods production.  Hence, the net effect really is 
theoretically ambiguous.   To measure these relative effects, we introduce a second index, 
which is the ratio of intermediate imports to final good imports.  
(30) 
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From observation 7, this effect will be ambiguous. 
 An econometric model is estimated for both indexes above.  Since the z1 index is 
a share, a logistic transformation is first performed.   Two samples are covered in the 
estimates in Tables 1 and 2.  One is a sub-sample, restricted to European countries with 
free trade either as part of the European Union, or as part of various European FTAs, all 
subject to pan-European accumulation rules.  The second set of regressions involves a 
full sample of OECD countries as both importers and/or exporters. Right hand side 
variables are explained in the tables. 
 Starting with the share of total intermediates trade (Table 1) several results stand 
out.  First, there is a border effect, both in Europe, and globally.  This means that 
national shares of intermediates trade increase when countries share a border.  This 
implies that multiple border crossings add economic distance.  However, a second effect 
relates to borders within a customs union.  Borders do not matter so much (i.e. the 
border effect more or less goes away) when we focus on intermediates trade within the 
European Union (our customs union in the sample) though they matter otherwise, both 
within Europe, and globally.  Another point to note is that, apart from borders, there is 
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no discernable difference between the EU and EEA pattern of trade within Europe.  
The rules governing pan-European accumulation do seem to work, in that they confer 
most of the benefits that follow from trade between EU Members.  Again, this is apart 
from the border effects.  Finally, both European and NAFTA preferential trade 
arrangements lead to discrimination against third countries.  However, the NAFTA 
regime is much stronger, leading to a greater shift away from third country suppliers, 
even after we control for differences in tariffs. 
We next turn to relative trade in intermediates and final goods.  Here, the results 
suggest that there is discrimination in final automobiles, in addition to automobile parts, 
against third countries, while there is at the same time no noticeable difference again 
within a European context.  As a result, the pattern of imports from third countries is 
more focused on parts than on final goods for both the European and North American 
markets.  Tariffs themselves have the expected effect, driving a shift from two-way trade 
in parts and toward final goods trade.  Yet, controlling for tariffs, the regimes in both 
Europe and North America drive a similar shift in total trade (finished vehicles and 
parts) away from finished vehicles and into parts.  The coefficients on these effects are 
virtually identical for both Europe and North America. 
 
4. Summary 
This paper is concerned with preferential trade agreements with two-way trade in 
intermediates, emphasizing patterns of production and trade and the relative importance 
of trade in intermediates with third countries.   This includes a discussion of the 
analytical implications of rules of origin in a world with Ethier-type two-way trade in 
differentiated intermediate goods.  The analytical approach introduces an innovation 
involving construction of a theoretical framework around an actual trade equilibrium. 
Individual pairs of countries are examined within the equilibrium defined by this set of 
world prices, to isolate and identify the impact that rules of original will have on 
preferential free trade.  Results point to systematic differences in the composition of 
trade between final and intermediate goods, and the relative importance of preferential 
trade partners as suppliers of final and intermediate goods.  
The analytical discussion is followed by an empirical examination of the implied 
impact of PTAs, rules of origin (a critical divide between FTAs and customs unions), and 
border effects on the pattern of intra-OECD trade in motor vehicle parts.  There is 
evidence that such rules do cause a systematic shift in the composition of trade in 
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intermediate goods away from third-countries, after we control for actual tariff 
preferences. There appears to be a particularly strong shift toward inputs sourced from 
FTA partners with the NAFTA, relative to expected trade under a customs union or 
European pan-accumulation rules.  At the same time, there is no apparent evidence that 
North American rules have a different that European ones on the pattern of final goods 
trade relative to intermediates.  
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Table 1: OLS estimates with robust standard errors 
ζ1 Partner share of total imports of parts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
Description 
Sample 1: 
European 
customs union 
or European 
accumulation 
rules 
Sample 2: 
All countries 
BORDER 1: country pair shares a 
border  
0: otherwise 
0.628 
(2.06, .040) 
 
0.716 
(2.32, .021) 
 
CU_BORDER 1: country shares a border 
and both are EU Members 
0: otherwise 
-0.712  
-(1.59, .066) 
 
 
 
-0.661 
-(1.75, .081) 
 
LNDISTW The natural log of distance -1.435 
-(6.64, .000) 
 
-1.002 
-(5.98, .051) 
 
lnT Log (1+t) N/A -2.141 
-(1.11, .267) 
not-EU 1: importer is and EU 
Member, but partner is not 
0: otherwise 
-0.334 
-(0.69, .493) 
N/A 
not_NAFTA 1: importer is a NAFTA 
member, but partner is not 
N/A -3.215 
-(6.68, .000) 
not_EEA 1: importer is an EEA 
member (EU, EFTA, 
CEFTA) and partner is not 
0: otherwise 
 
N/A 
-1.084 
-(2.36, .019) 
  R-sq: .8800 
obs: 297 
d.f.: 257 
R-sq: .8310 
obs: 621 
df: 563 
 
Estimated are based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors.  Since left-hand side 
variables are measured as shares, dependant variables in the regressions are logistic 
transformations of the original share terms. t-ratios are given in parentheses “( )” with 
significance levels in italics.  For the first regression, sample is restricted to EU Members and 
countries that have otherwise implemented pan-European accumulation rules. 
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Table 2: OLS estimates with robust standard errors 
ζ2 Relative importance of intermediates versus final goods in bilateral imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
Description 
Sample 1: 
European 
customs union 
or European 
accumulation 
rules 
Sample 2: 
All countries 
BORDER 1: country pair shares a 
border  
0: otherwise 
0.239 
(0.34, .073) 
 
0.328 
(0.65, .514) 
 
CU_BORDER 1: country shares a border 
and both are EU Members 
0: otherwise 
-0.457 
-(0.60, .549) 
 
 
 
-0.045 
-(0.07, .947) 
 
LNDISTW The natural log of distance -0.757 
-(0.12, .901) 
 
-0.043 
-(0.09, .928) 
 
lnT Log (1+t) N/A -15.211 
-(2.60, .010) 
not-EU 1: importer is and EU 
Member, but partner is not 
0: otherwise 
0.022 
-(0.02, .984) 
N/A 
not_NAFTA 1: importer is a NAFTA 
member, but partner is not 
N/A 2.397 
(1.92, .056) 
not_EEA 1: importer is an EEA 
member (EU, EFTA, 
CEFTA) and partner is not 
0: otherwise 
 
N/A 
2.606 
(1.98, .048) 
  R-sq: .8800 
obs: 297 
d.f.: 257 
R-sq: .4089 
obs: 585 
df: 56 
 
Estimated are based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors.  Since left-hand side 
variables are measured as shares, dependant variables in the regressions are logistic 
transformations of the original share terms. t-ratios are given in parentheses “( )” with 
significance levels in italics.  For the first regression, sample is restricted to EU Members and 
countries that have otherwise implemented pan-European accumulation rules  
 
